来自《THE AUSTRALIAN》特约编辑Paul Kelly的评论员文章
澳大利亚外交政策的任务是实事求是的看待世界，同时不要成为这一现实的牺牲品。将之应用在对华关系方面，需要我们认知到两国关系正处在螺旋式下降的严酷局面，同时也要消除一种“澳大利亚对改善这种局面无能为力”的悲观想法。
堪培拉（指澳洲政府）的部分政治体系中，存在着一种危险的情绪。这些危险情绪现在蔓延到我们舆论届的精英身上。我们的对华政策是什么？如果我们像做一个历史预言那样假定中国是敌人，那么中国就会成为一个真正的敌人，没有什么比这个更加确定的了。当我们的假定实现了，那么情况越糟糕，对华鹰派就越会吹嘘自己的预言是多么的正确。
这个进程现在正在上演，与中国关系的恶化程度愈演愈烈。最新的一个例子就是中国上周对澳大利亚记者的报复。当然我们同意此事根源在于习近平主席严苛而自信并具有控制力的方针策略。但是澳大利亚宿命论（意思是认为中国是敌人）也是难脱其咎。
希望有一天，莫里森总理能与中国国务院总理李克强坐下来。他将提供哪些积极的信息，在哪些领域进行合作，如何修复关系？在澳大利亚听了过多关于中国的评论后，你会认为一连串的警告，不满和谴责是中国的一项基本（外交）政策。但是，他们没有。
我们有可能支持大多数特恩布尔和莫里森政府与中国有关的具体决定，但像我一样，仍会问“澳大利亚想得到什么“？因为这个问题没有得到充分解答。有一种立场应被彻底杜绝，那就是：中国已成为一个敌对国家，澳大利亚必须接受北京（指中国政府）施加的任何报复，以彰显我们以我们的主权和价值观为荣。这是一条走向毁灭的路，但该论调不乏拥趸。
关于中国的三个误区困扰着我们。第一个误区就是，我们无法改善双边关系，因为那只会损害我们的本色。这种想法是愚蠢的。
如果今天的关系恶化趋势再持续3到4年，我们国家将蒙受巨大损失。我们需要政策断路器（来终止恶化趋势），但这种政策既不容易识别也不容易实施。同时我们必须意识到，就连保持现在的局势也成为艰巨的任务（意思指关系可能继续恶化）。
然而，在澳洲国内对中国的辩论全都朝一个方向，不同寻常的是，左右两翼分子这次意见一致。右翼以国家威胁为导向，对主权侵犯保持警惕，视北京为存在的危险。左翼则因无法为中国大规模侵犯人权行为和不断发展的政府监控行为开脱，于是将北京视为无可救药的罪人。
2016-18年间，澳大利亚对中国有了深刻的认识。（如何面对中国的崛起）这是一个世界性现象，但也是一个特殊的澳大利亚事件。因为澳大利亚比其他任何一个西方国家都更受益于2003年之后中国的繁荣，结果，澳大利亚开始专注于证明自己不会被一个自信的中国所挟持。
我们现在已经一次又一次的证明了这一点。现在，我们对中国的态度必须从不断的“你不能恐吓我们“循环中跳出来。通过向北京出卖自己来修复关系固然是错误的，但是如果因为担心被视为出卖自己而不提供任何东西，不做任何关系上的修复，那同样也是错误的。
第二个误区是认为我们庞大的资源贸易不会受到北京的报复。我们可能认为北京不会对我们的煤炭，天然气或铁矿石采取行动，因为这会伤害中国自己。但是当中国做长远打算的时候，这个答案就过于短视了。请关注下中国的2025年中国制造核心技术自给自足战略。
如果你认为西澳和澳大利亚其他地区的关系现在有点紧张，你还无法想象这种破裂已经在我们的联邦政府中出现了。中国今年已经打破规则，开始进行报复，而这一幕以往只存在于大学研讨会中，现在我们看看大麦，牛肉，葡萄酒还有媒体。我们不知道接下来会发生什么。
第三个误区就是认为由于关系破裂主要不是澳大利亚的过错，而是源于中国自身的行动，在这种情况下，我们几乎没有或完全没有酌处权。
这是一个心态问题（意指澳洲对美对中无法一视同仁，所以提到了特朗普）。特朗普总统的就职给澳大利亚带来了许多风险，我们花费了巨大的努力和国家资本来维持这艘船的运转（特恩布尔回忆录中有详细解释）。
莫里森表示，他将对北京“保持耐心并保持一致”。他不会挂断（来自北京的）电话。他也宣布澳大利亚的政策是“独立的”，不受美国束缚。但是这些信息仍旧无法弥补澳中两国在地区，战略，技术和投资问题上日益严重的国家级利益冲突。冲突领域扩大了，合作领域缩小了。但是它们并没有消失。
在这种新的常态之下，澳大利亚的政策需要重新平衡。我们需要重视堪培拉和北京可以在哪些领域开展合作，而不是仅仅假设我们将成为永久的对手。这必须从在新冠疫情之后的经济，贸易和旅游的恢复中开始，在这个世界中，国家间仍然有着巨大的共同利益。
堪培拉需要确保情报和安全机构不主导双边关系。一位政治资深人士告诉我：“与冷战时期相比，这些机构现在的影响力更大。”当然，他们已经定下了政策基调。有迹象表明，中国针对澳大利亚两名记者的行动至少部分是由ASIO（澳大利亚安全情报组织）针对驻澳大利亚中国记者的调查引发的。
在2000年代初期，我们的驻美国大使Michael Thawley在美国国会组织了“澳大利亚之友”小组，以促使美国政治体系与澳大利亚达成自由贸易协定。今天，澳大利亚议会中的任何“中国之友”小组都没有希望建立。任何此类影响都将不可避免的被认为是国家干涉。
现在中国已经确认是地区的主导力量，它坚定危险的权威主义不会很快消失。我们只有一个选择，或者选择将中国视为关系进一步恶化的对手，或者遏制宿命论，把阻止这种恶性循环放在新的优先位置。
编译来源： THE AUSTRALIAN
原文链接： https://www.theaustralian.com.au ... 0d48f55fc935491103b
The task of Australian foreign policy is to see the world as it exists but not fall victim to that reality. Applied to China this demands a brutal recognition of the downward spiral in our relations but a purging of the pessimism that Australia can do nothing to improve things.
There is a dangerous mood afoot in parts of the Canberra bureaucratic and political systems. Beyond that, these dangers now extend into our opinion-making elites. What is the goal of our China policy? If we operate on the assumption that China is the enemy then, as history foretells, China will become the enemy. Nothing is more certain. Our assumptions will be realised and the worse things get, the more the China hawks will boast how right they were.
This process now is being played out. The deteriorating ties with China have a life and momentum of their own. The latest proof was China’s retaliation against Australian journalists last week. Of course, the originating problem is President Xi Jinping’s ruthless, controlling and assertive strategy. We can all agree on that. But the associated risk is Australian fatalism.
One day, hopefully, Scott Morrison will sit down with China’s Premier, Li Keqiang. What positive messages, what areas of co-operation, what methods to repair relations will he offer? Listening to much of the debate about China in Australia you would think a litany of warnings, dissatisfactions and denunciations of China constitute a policy. Well, they don’t.
What is Australia trying to achieve? It is possible to support most of the Turnbull and Morrison governments’ specific decisions that relate to China — as I do — but still ask this question because it is not sufficiently answered. There is one stance that should be rejected outright: that China has become such a hostile power that Australia must accept whatever retaliation Beijing inflicts in order to honour our sovereignty and values. This is the road to doom, but it has its champions.
There are three myths about China that cloud our minds. The first is that we can do nothing to improve relations because that would only compromise who we are. Such thinking is monumental folly. The China debate cannot end with Australia luxuriating in its resolution when what is needed is judgment.
This country has much to lose if today’s downward spiral continues for another three or four years. A circuit-breaker is needed, neither easy to identify nor implement. But a policy effort to put a floor under the deterioration is essential along with the recognition that even stabilising the present situation will be an immense task.
Yet the domestic debate on China is being driven in only one direction because, unusually, the right and left agree. The right, always threat oriented and alert to sovereignty infringements, sees Beijing as an existential danger. The left, unable to excuse China’s human rights abuses on an industrial scale and its evolving surveillance state, sees Beijing as an irredeemable offender.
During 2016-18 Australia underwent a necessary awakening about China. It was a worldwide phenomenon but also a particular Australian event. This is because more than any other Western nation Australia was the beneficiary of the post-2003 China boom and, as a consequence, became fixated on the need to prove an assertive China could not hold us hostage.
We have now made this point, over and over. Our attitude towards China must transcend a reoccurring cycle of “you cannot intimidate us” based on endless examples of Beijing’s infringements. It would be a mistake to “fix” relations by selling out to Beijing; but it is an equal mistake to offer nothing and make no effort to “fix” relations for fear of looking as if we have sold out.
It is difficult to assess what interest China has in salvaging bilateral relations but Australian policy needs to interrogate this subject.
The second myth is that our massive resources trade is safe from Beijing’s retaliation. Why is this so? China now invests in alternative sources of iron ore. Yet we assume Beijing won’t act against our coal, liquefied natural gas or iron ore because that would hurt China. This answer is too short-term when China thinks long term; witness its 2025 Made in China strategy of self-sufficiency in core technology.
Does anybody doubt China wants to reduce its dependence on Australian imports? Yet the people who keep pointing out that China is an authoritarian, ideologically bound, one-party state are often the same people saying when it comes to the resources trade China will act as an economically rational liberal state, thinking only of price competitiveness. Have no doubt, if the downward spiral continues, Australia has stacks of treasure yet to lose. Resources will come into play.
And if you think relations between Western Australia and the rest of the country are strained now, you cannot imagine the fracture that will enter our federation at that point. China has thrown out the rule book this year; it has engaged in retaliations once merely the subject of university seminars — witness barley, beef, wine and media among others. And Australia doesn’t know what’s coming next.
The third myth is that because the rupture in relations is not primarily Australia’s fault but stems from China’s own actions that we have little or no discretionary capacity in this situation.
This is a mindset problem. The Trump presidency posed many risks for Australia but we expended huge efforts and prime ministerial capital to keep the ship afloat (explained in detail in the Turnbull memoir).
Morrison says he will be “patient and consistent” with Beijing. He won’t hang by the phone for a call. He announces that Australian policy is “independent” and not chained to the US. But these messages cannot compensate for the mounting conflict of national interest between Australia and China on regional, strategic, technology and investment issues. The areas of conflict have expanded and the areas for co-operation have contracted. But they have not disappeared.
In this new normal Australian policy needs to rebalance. We need to give greater priority to where Canberra and Beijing can work together, not just assume we become permanent adversaries. This must start with the renewal of economic, trade and tourism ties in the post-COVID-19 world where substantial mutual interest still exists.
Canberra needs to ensure that the intelligence and security agencies do not dominate bilateral relations. One policy veteran told me: “These agencies have more influence now than during the Cold War.” Certainly they have set the mood. Signs are that Chinese action against the two Australian journalists was driven at least partly by ASIO probes against Chinese journalists in Australia. So, how successful was this transaction?
Our foreign interference laws can set up a cycle of action and reaction. The obvious answer is to say: Beijing should stop its interference. The harder, realistic response is to say that Australia must be careful how it operates in that grey area where there can be a fine line between interference and influence.
In the early 2000s Michael Thawley, our ambassador to the US, organised the Friends of Australia group in the US congress to pressure the American political system to deliver the free-trade agreement with Australia. There would be no hope today for any Friends of China group in the Australian parliament. Any such influence would be seen inevitably as interference.
China is entrenched now as the dominant power in our region and its assertive, sinister, authoritarianism won’t disappear soon. We have a choice — to assume the only option is to treat China as an adversary power in a relationship guaranteed to deteriorate further, or to curb the fatalism and put a new priority on trying to halt this vicious spiral.
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翻译长篇文章，楼主了不起
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文章作者对中国了解比较肤浅。
“莫里森总理能与中国国务院总理李克强坐下来”，和李克强谈又什么用，他说了又不算。
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关键是澳洲把美国的外交政策当作自己的。
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怎么不提澳洲能否不看美国脸色行事？或者说敢不敢不跟美国屁股后跑？这才是问题的本质。
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坚持独立外交政策
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长路漫漫才开始
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这个编辑抓起来！太不符合澳洲的价值观了！居然敢说澳洲错了！
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ASIO会去抄家。
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政府里应该多些华裔中国问题专家，真正了解中国
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难道莫里森总理说的算么？
需要多看新闻了解澳大利亚政体啊。。。
当初阿伯特总理还对安倍晋三拍胸脯，澳洲打包买日本潜艇，日本把潜艇企划书都做好了，澳洲又改招标，和法国共建了。
莫总的话，早晚可能都不一样的，上次早上说要强制疫苗，下午就改口疫苗自愿了。
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感谢楼主辛苦翻译长篇！！
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政府确实找了个中国专家，那個Maree Ma是李大师组织的。
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我看新闻今年10月份的中国进博会澳洲也不去了； 其实用“也”是错的， 因为只有澳洲不去，其他包括美国都要去，哎。。。
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我孤陋寡闻了，没听说过这个Maree ma
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https://apac.news/chinese-uncle-sam-grabs-ccp-playbook/
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澳洲对华政策研究部门有两个华人。
一个是轮轮儿，一个是运运儿。
气得该机构领导人，前自由党部长辞职了。
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我记得金灿荣还是谁说过，澳大利亚了解中国，甚至包括部分了解中国的专家，不超过5个人，所以澳洲政府制定对华政策是非常混乱的。
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lz辛苦！
作者是个聪明人，应该是还是提醒大家，刚开始与中国建交时，我们政府是怎么想的
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你看看最後第二段
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拉倒吧，Australian写了多少莫须有的文章？
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莫总: 接受澳洲价值观，只许我搞你，不许你反击，我就跟你修复关系
中国: 。。。
莫总: 说话，请回答
中国: 。。。
莫总: 你到底有没有在听?
中国: 。。。
莫总: 再不回话，明天报纸头版头条就要报道你们霸凌我们
中国: 。。。
嘟嘟嘟。。。
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总理都是和总理对话，这是外交惯例。虽然最后主事的是习大大
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澳洲难得有这样的明白人啊！可惜，声音太小，没人愿意听
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这个记者会不会被查与中国有间谍往来....
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人家轮轮儿为了川普花了多少钱，安排几个人不过分吧！
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金更不了解澳大利亚。
澳大利亚专家对中国的了解要比金对澳大利亚的了解深入且广泛。
但是不同的人会选择不同的顾问，专家只是工具。
比如说，北京可以选金做国际问题专家，也可以选吴建民做国际问题专家。重点不在于专家，在于当政者想听那种建言。
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我想知道的是：
中國國內有哪一家報紙的記者編輯能發類似的文章？
(把中國和澳洲的位置換位)
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中澳关系由中美关系决定
中美关系不好，中澳关系就不会好
中美关系会变好吗，不会
所以中澳关系也不会变好
就是这么简单粗暴，不信走着瞧
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