与中国一样，澳大利亚也在军事化东海岸的水域
澳大利亚和中国拥有截然不同的地理位置，但在一个关键方面，中澳两国是相似的：两国的大部分财富和人口都集中在东部沿海地区。两国东海岸面对的这些包含星罗棋布小岛屿的海洋，如果被敌对势力控制，可以用来阻止中国或澳大利亚船只进入广阔的太平洋参与全球贸易 - 可以实际削弱两国经济。当然，中国毗邻南海和东海。澳大利亚毗邻国际上较少讨论的珊瑚海（对澳大利亚而言，塔斯曼海已经安全）。无独有偶，中国巩固对中国南海和东海的控制的同时，澳大利亚一直致力于巩固对珊瑚海的控制。仅是两国的实现手段有所不同。
近年来国际上已经充分报道中国南海军事化，但中国在南海和东海实际上并没有新的海上主张。1912年，中国-这里指中华民国 - 首次公布了一幅描绘中国在南海的海上主张的地图。随着时间的推移，标注虚线的数量和虚线的确切位置略有变化，但总的来说，中国的领土主张在蒋介石、毛泽东之后基本上是一脉相承 - 在习近平领导的今天仍然如此。东海也是一样。尽管直到最近，中国的海军力量才试图挑战日本对尖阁列岛的控制，中国自14世纪以来就称这些岛屿为中国的一部分。
从这个意义上看，中国在南海和东海的军事化可以说已经有几百年的历史了。随着时间的流逝，潮起潮落的只是中国在这些海域投射力量的起伏 - 近些年开始重建的力量。目前中国南海和东海领土争端的开始有两个日期：1974年1月19日，当时中国海军击退了企图占领西沙群岛的南越海军，建立南海事实控制；1971年11月24日，日本国会与美国政府达成一项交易，将尖阁列岛的控制权从美国转移到日本 - 这事实上将中国海上贸易通道交给33年前在中国南京犯下屠杀和强奸罪行的国家
。
自20世纪70年代以来，中国将经济手段，政治压力，军事力量和外交手段结合起来，确保对这些至关重要的海洋领域持续控制。近年来，中国更多的依靠军事力量。这反映中国海军力量的崛起。很难确定中国何时开始在南海的岛屿上建立军事设施 - 例如，1990年，中国就在伍迪岛上建造了一条跑道和机场，但直到2016年，中国才在岛上部署了地对空导弹和战斗机。可以说，中国几十年来始终如一，只是近年来反对的声音更大了。至于尖阁列岛，中国海军舰艇偶尔会进入日本领海，以张显其力量存在。自2016年以来，这种航行的频率有所增加。中国还向愿意承认其主张，或是对中国在南海造岛睁一只眼闭一只眼的国家提供发展援助和经济奖励，最近中国对菲律宾关系好转就是最突出的例子。
澳大利亚及英语国家集团（主要是新西兰，英国和美国）以及日本都注意到中国在南海的缓慢但稳定的崛起及其对中国希望增加东海控制力。中国的所作所为其实并不关键 - 在可能性极小的情况下，战争爆发，南海海岛上的军事设施可以被摧毁，而且可以轻易遏制对海岛的再补给 - 关键的是中国持续缓慢的征服这些地区预示着什么。除了偶尔的航行自由行动之外，没有任何国家实实在在的阻止中国。主要原因是，对于有能力阻止中国的国家来说，为控制南海的珊瑚礁，环礁和岛屿与中国敌对是得不偿失的。澳大利亚和新西兰更关心的是中国会不会在珊瑚海采用类似战略。虽然中国对南太平洋各岛国的所有权没有任何历史主张，但中国政府采取其它各种可用的策略手段不会有任何顾虑。
澳大利亚对中国的回应基本上模仿了中国在南海的战略 - 尽管采取的战术截然不同。这也是出于现实需要。毕竟，中国是世界历史上最古老的文明，中国想要控制的许多岛屿都是无人居住的;有些甚至连岛屿都算不上。相比之下，澳大利亚是大英帝国近代的创造，盎格鲁撒克逊白人新教徒对南太平洋的帝国统治已经日落西山。此外，许多澳大利亚需要建立战略关系的岛国并非无人居住的。中国南海和东海行之有效的方法，不适用于澳大利亚在珊瑚海的情况 - 澳大利亚必须更加关注潜在的合作伙伴。如果澳大利亚过于苛刻，推动南太平洋国家扑入中国的怀抱，正中下怀。尽管中国有着扩张主义的野心，但4,800公里的距离，对南太平洋岛国而言是非常有吸引力的潜在合作伙伴。
澳大利亚在2018年大大加快了珊瑚海战略的执行。无论是通过与瓦努阿图签署新的双边安全条约，增加澳大利亚在整个地区的援助和发展项目，还是为太平洋岛屿论坛带来新的安全框架，澳大利亚都在努力确保成为珊瑚海的主导力量。上个月，澳大利亚阻止中国为斐济的一个主要地区军事基地提供资金。澳大利亚的出价不仅是高于中国，而且正如斐济军方参谋长对澳大利亚报纸所言，提供更“全面”的伙伴关系，而不仅仅是为了影响力而大把挥撒人民币。澳大利亚上个月还完成了对巴布亚新几内亚马努斯岛Lombrum海军基地的基础设施升级改造。据报道，澳大利亚正在与巴布亚新几内亚谈判，将该基地建成澳大利亚永久性海军驻地（两国预计将于11月中旬正式达成协议）。澳大利亚广播公司ABC上个月也报道说，澳大利亚士兵可能在不久的将来开始在巴布亚新几内亚进行定期轮调。
可以毫不夸张地说，澳大利亚正在珊瑚海进行“军事化”。正在改造海军设施，以便能够容纳澳大利亚和美国的海军资产; 澳大利亚与邻国签署加强的新安保协议;在珊瑚海地区部署部队;向邻国提供海军资产（澳大利亚计划在2023年底之前向12个太平洋国家和东帝汶提供21艘护卫舰）;并为所罗门群岛的海底高速互联网光缆等开发项目投入资金。目标很简单：确保没有敌对澳大利亚的外国势力可以利用这些岛国来阻止澳大利亚的国际贸易，或者在最坏的情况下，作为入侵的跳板。中国不能阻止澳大利亚控制珊瑚海，同样的，澳大利亚也不能够阻止中国控制南海。 （至于东海，只要日本海军军力仍然超过中国海军，只要日本仍然是美国的坚定盟友 - 换句话说，在相当长的一段时间内，东海将继续控制在日本人手里。）
中澳两国其实也没有征服对方的后院的必要。实际上，中国和澳大利亚正在做的事情显然是在绘制本国的防线 - 并且在划线区域内有大量的水域和土地。实际上，中国和澳大利亚之间有三个国家作为缓冲国家：印度尼西亚，马来西亚和菲律宾。在未来几十年内，太平洋地区霸权争夺的真正斗争将主要围绕这三个国家展开。这场霸权之争仍处于起步阶段。目前，两个地区大国正在克服外部威胁，加强对本国最大弱点的保护，澳大利亚的需要克服障碍较少，有了一个良好的开端。
https://www.pressreader.com/cypr ... 006/281479277363201
评论
6 Oct 2018 Financial Mirror (Cyprus)By Jacob Shapiro
The Coral Sea: A mirror image of the South China Sea
Australia, like China, is militarising the waters off its eastern coast
Australia and China possess profoundly different geographies, but in one key way, they are similar: the bulk of the wealth and populations of both countries is concentrated on eastern-facing coasts. These coasts, in turn, face seas containing small islands that, if held by a hostile power, could be used to block Chinese or Australian ships from entering the greater Pacific and engaging in global trade – in effect, crippling their economies. China, of course, is facing the South and East China seas. Australia is next to the lessdiscussed Coral Sea (the Tasman Sea being virtually secure already). China’s imperative to solidify its grip over the South and East China seas is mirrored by Australia’s recent push to solidify its control over the Coral Sea. The difference is how each goes about doing it.
China’s militarisation of the South China Sea in recent years has been well publicised, but there is nothing recent about Chinese territorial claims in the South and East China seas. China – that is, the Republic of China – first published a map delineating its maritime claims in the South China Sea in 1912. The number of dashes used and the precise claims on this line have changed slightly over time, but overall, China’s territorial claims were essentially the same under Mao as under Chiang – and remain so under Xi today. The same is true of the East China Sea, though until recently China’s naval capabilities precluded any attempt at challenging Japanese control over the Senkaku Islands, which China has claimed as its own since the 14th century.
In this sense, Chinese militarisation of the South and East China seas can legitimately be described as centuries-old. What has ebbed and flowed over time was China’s ability to project power in these seas – a capability it has only just begun to redevelop. The beginning of the current territorial disputes in the South and East China seas can be located in two dates: January 19, 1974, when the Chinese navy fought off an attempt by the South Vietnamese navy to take the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, establishing de facto Chinese control, and November 24, 1971, when the Japanese Diet ratified a deal transferring control of the Senkakus from the United States to Japan – in effect, putting Chinese maritime trading lanes in the hands of a country that had committed the Rape of Nanking 33 years prior.
Since the 1970s, China has used a combination of economic incentives, political pressure, military force and diplomatic niceties to ensure its continued control of these vital maritime domains. In recent years, it has relied more on military force to do so, a reflection of the Chinese navy’s rising power. It’s hard to pinpoint exactly when China began establishing military installations on islands in the South China Sea – in 1990, for example, China built a runway and airport on Woody Island, but it deployed surface-to-air missiles and fighter jets on the island only in 2016. Suffice to say, China has been doing so for decades, even if opposition has become vocal only in recent years. As for the Senkakus, Chinese naval ships occasionally enter Japanese territorial waters to make their presence known, but the frequency of such assertion of navigation acts has increased since 2016. China also offers development aid and economic incentives to countries willing to recognize its claims or overlook its island-making in the South China Sea, with its recent courting of the Philippines being the most prominent example.
Australia and its fellow English-speaking countries (New Zealand, the U.K. and the U.S., primarily), as well as Japan, have taken note of the slow and steady rise of Chinese power in the South China Sea and its desire for power in the East China Sea. At issue is not so much what China has done – in the unlikely event of war, the military installations on South China Sea islands could be destroyed and their resupply could be fairly easily curbed – but what the continued slow conquering of these regions might portend. There has been no serious attempt to stop China beyond the occasional freedom of navigation operation, mostly because for the countries powerful enough to stop China, control over the reefs, atolls and islands in the South China Sea are not worth fighting for. What concerns Australia (and New Zealand) more is the way China has been using a similar strategy in the Coral Sea. Though China has no historical claim to ownership of the various island nations of the South Pacific, everything else in its toolkit is fair game.
Australia has responded by essentially mimicking China’s strategy in the South China Sea – though with extremely different tactics. This is in part by necessity. China, after all, is the oldest civilisation in world history, and many of the islands it wants to control are uninhabited; some aren’t even islands. Australia, by comparison, is a relatively recent creation of the British Empire, and the sun has set on the imperial rule of the South Pacific by white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. In addition, many of the island nations with which Australia needs strategic relationships are not uninhabited. What works for China in the South and East China seas cannot work for Australia in the Coral Sea – Australia has to be far more solicitous of its would-be partners. If Australia is too heavy-handed, it only serves to drive South Pacific countries into the waiting arms of China, which, despite its expansionist ambitions, is roughly 4,800 kilometers away, making it a potentially very attractive partner for South Pacific countries.
Australia has greatly accelerated its execution of this strategy in 2018. Whether by signing a new bilateral security treaty with Vanuatu, increasing its aid and development projects throughout the region, or spearheading a new security framework for the Pacific Islands Forum, Australia is trying to ensure that it is the dominant power of the Coral Sea. Last month, it blocked China from funding a major regional military base in Fiji by not just outbidding Beijing but, as Fiji’s military chief of staff told The Australian newspaper, by offering a more “holistic” partnership rather than simply trading yuan for influence. Australia also completed upgrading infrastructure at Papua New Guinea’s Lombrum Naval Base on Manus Island last month, and it is reportedly negotiating with PNG to establish a permanent Australian naval presence at the base (the official agreement is expected in mid-November). Australian broadcaster ABC also reported last month that Australian soldiers might begin regular troop rotations in Papua New Guinea in the near future.
It would not be an exaggeration to say that Australia is “militarising” the Coral Sea. It is renovating naval facilities to be able to host Australian and presumably U.S. naval assets; signing new, beefed-up security agreements with neighbouring countries; deploying troops in the region; providing neighbors with naval assets (Australia plans to provide 21 Guardian-class vessels to 12 Pacific nations and East Timor by 2023); and spending money on development projects like undersea high-speed internet cables for the Solomon Islands — among other things. The goal is simple: Make sure that no foreign power hostile to Australia's interests can use these countries to block trade in and out of Australia, or in a worst-case scenario, as a springboard for invasion. China can no more prevent Australia from securing control over the Coral Sea than Australia can prevent China from securing control over the South China Sea. (As for the East China Sea, that will remain in Japanese hands for as long as the Japanese navy outclasses the Chinese, and for as long as Japan remains a stalwart U.S. ally — in other words, for quite a long time.) Nor does either have an imperative to conquer the other's backyard. In effect, what both China and Australia are doing is clearly drawing their defensive lines — and there is a great deal of water and land between the lines being drawn. Indeed, there are three buffer states of particular import between China and Australia: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. It is in these three countries that the real battle for supremacy in the Pacific will primarily be fought in the coming decades. That competition, however, is still in its infancy. For now, two regional powers are shoring up their greatest weaknesses from external threats, and Australia, with fewer obstacles to overcome, has a head start.
评论
不少钱
评论
澳中两个大国争霸之间隔着的不只是印尼，马来和菲律宾啊，还有许许多多澳洲的哥哥姐姐叔叔伯伯姨妈姑姑舅舅爷爷奶奶姥姥姥爷干爹干妈国，虽然澳洲面对文莱新几内亚努瓦阿土啥的可以很霸气，想要和中国争霸啥的，得让长辈们先上。
不过总的说得不错，中国没有出界的要求，只是不断重申一直的都声明的海域，有时候声音大有时候声音小，只是自身实力的变化而已。几百年都是自家修整打理的院子，生病几年没力气打扫，进来阿猫阿狗拉屎做窝，现在病好点了有力气了，把它们扫出去是正常的。
评论
澳洲不是一直跟印尼争霸吗
评论
钱是关健，而且澳洲人的勤劳程度也远不如中国
评论
感谢楼主分享，
翻译这么长的文章，真不容易！
送上浮云，略表心意
评论
感谢分享，翻译辛苦了
评论
原标题不够惊悚，开始无耻的采用华人公众号的标题手法骗点击骗眼球了。
评论
这文章算客观
评论
这也是澳洲紧抱美国大腿不放的原因。放了连印尼都应付不了。但是说到勤劳什么的，中国人是没得选择，否则懒人也不会少。
评论
标题翻译的有点离题吧
评论
评论
观点不一样
澳洲中文论坛热点
- 悉尼部份城铁将封闭一年，华人区受影响！只能乘巴士（组图）
- 据《逐日电讯报》报导，从明年年中开始，因为从Bankstown和Sydenham的城铁将因Metro South West革新名目而
- 联邦政客们具有多少房产？
- 据本月早些时分报导，绿党副首领、参议员Mehreen Faruqi已获准在Port Macquarie联系其房产并建造三栋投资联