在新西兰
Goldman Sachs Research (高盛)
FX Views: Justified but Unsustainable: The Outlook for the Kiwi Dollar
Published 11:50 AM Fri Oct 3 2014
1. The Kiwi Dollar has recently witnessed an impressive weakening. Since early July it has depreciated by around 8% relative to its G10 peers, driven in part by an 11% weakening of NZD/$ (Exhibit 1). Despite the large depreciation, the RBNZ argued in a recent report (published on September 25) that it still sees the level of the exchange rate as “unjustified and unsustainable”, and that it believes the Kiwi Dollar is "susceptible to a significant downward adjustment over the coming six to nine months” (see here and here). But, given the sizeable weakness we have seen over the past two weeks, can that really still be true? And, if so, just how overvalued is the Kiwi? In this week’s FX views, we show that, based on structural factors alone, the Kiwi Dollar remains expensive. We continue to expect a sizeable depreciation of NZD/$ over the longer run, to 0.63, on the back of declines in New Zealand’s terms-of-trade, slow relative productivity growth and a protracted US cyclical outperformance. The recent move in the NZD has, in RBNZ speak, brought the exchange rate closer to “justified levels” based on business cycle drivers. But also over the short-to-medium term, we continue to see some downside risks to the tune of around 4% lower in both NZD/$ and in the G10 trade-weighted exchange rate.
2. The recent Kiwi weakness was sparked by the confluence of three relatively well-known factors, which dovetail with the fundamental arguments for a weaker NZD that we have previously laid out. First, there have been sizeable declines in commodity prices worldwide. The ANZ commodity price index, which tracks movements in the prices received for New Zealand’s main exports, has fallen by over 12% since it peaked in early January this year (Exhibit 1). The decline in New Zealand export prices has, in turn, been driven by a marked softening of the China growth outlook, in combination with a destocking cycle of dairy products in mainland China and, more recently, Russia’s ban on European dairy exports. Second, while the effect of the RBNZ’s intervention on the exchange rate in August remains unclear, the intervention period coincided with notable exchange rate weakness (Exhibit 2). At the same time, the mere announcement of the RBNZ’s August intervention on September 29 pushed NZD/$ down a further 2%. The threat of additional intervention should, in our view, deter any rapid bounce back in the Kiwi Dollar. Last, while New Zealand’s growth outlook is enviable compared with most of its G10 peers, since July both short- and long-term interest rate differentials have started to move in the US’s favour. This has, all else equal, helped subdue the ‘hunt for yield’ that has otherwise been so supportive for the Kiwi Dollar. Assessing the relative impact of these various factors is, of course, difficult. But a simple regression-based framework -- controlling for interest rate differentials, interventions, changes in risk-appetite and commodity prices – puts NZD/$ two-to-five big figures below its current value of 0.78 (Exhibit 3). In RBNZ speak, the current level of the exchange rate no longer looks as obviously ‘unjustified’ relative to where economic factors that typically explain currency moves over the business cycle would place it -- especially given the 11% move we have seen so far. However, a similar percentage overvaluation is found for the trade-weighted exchange rate. To achieve this trade-weighted decline during a period of broad-based US Dollar strength points to somewhat larger short-term downside risks for NZD/$ beyond the two-to-five big figures discussed directly above.
3. Going forward, we view the short-run risks to the Kiwi Dollar as tilted to the downside. This is based on two offsetting factors: First, while the New Zealand growth outlook has recently moderated from high levels (our CAI has fallen to 2.9%yoy from a peak of 4.9%yoy in February), we expect dairy prices to eventually recoup some of their losses from current levels. As we have argued elsewhere, we expect the China dairy inventory drawdown to slow and the decline in Chinese dairy production to draw in the direction of higher dairy prices. Admittedly, the most recent Fonterra auction saw prices fall a further 7%, so there is limited evidence of stabilisation at this stage. But international prices are now well below where we would judge marginal production costs would put them. While milk prices are difficult to forecast precisely, our model suggests a 10% recovery in milk prices would be worth up to a 3% appreciation in NZD/$. Second, in contrast after 100bp of tightening, the RBNZ curve has recently repriced lower: the relative weakening of the growth and inflation outlook has pushed down market expectations of RBNZ hikes by about 35-40bp over the next year, driving forecasts of the next rate hike close to the expected date of the Fed lift-off. Combining this with the RBNZ’s surprising eagerness to talk down the exchange rate, the environment does not look overly conducive to a rapid bounce-back in the Kiwi Dollar on the back of rising commodity prices. Add to that our expectation of continued broad-based USD strength, coupled with uncertainty about the growth outlook for China and New Zealand, the distribution of risks are tilted to the downside.
4. While the above framework demonstrates that the current level of the NZD may be closer to “justifiable”, the “unsustainable” label – i.e., the exchange rate is overvalued relative to where it would be expected to settle when shorter-term business cycle factors have dissipated – appears reasonable. Indeed, our longer-term end-2017 forecast of 0.63 for NZD/$ is a reflection of this view. Exhibits 4 and 5 show that, relative to our preferred GSDEER metric and based on purchasing power calculations and the Peterson Institutes’ FEER estimates, the Kiwi Dollar appears substantially overvalued (by on average 16%). Our longer-term end-2017 forecast sees a gradual normalization of the terms-of-trade as the driving force behind a correction of this overvaluation. But we also believe that a weaker relative productivity trend and higher inflation should contribute to this expected decline. The speed with which we approach our longer-term forecast will, in particular, depend on how far milk prices recover in the short run. It is worth noting that Prime Minister Key recently mentioned in a speech that ‘the desirable level’ for NZD/$ is close to 0.65 – not far from our end-2017 forecast and equal to our GSDEER fair value estimate.
5. The 19% additional depreciation we envisage over the longer term in NZD/$ is, clearly, large – even by historical standards. But, as Exhibit 6 shows, it is far from unprecedented. This time around, however, the drivers behind our expected decline are different. Previous incidents of large historical depreciation have – with the exception of the Great Financial Crisis – been episodes where New Zealand yields have fallen in tandem with US yields and terms-of-trade have softened only moderately. All of the large declines in Exhibit 6 were associated with periods of global recession or crisis as well as negative domestic growth. In contrast, over the longer run we expect a pronounced weakening of the terms-of-trade and a normalisation of the interest rate premium offered by New Zealand assets based on relatively stronger US growth to drive Kiwi weaker. The additional 19% downside we expect in NZD/$ should be seen in the context of a 16% appreciation of the USD against the G10 through to end-2017.
Alexandre Kohlhas, George Cole, Philip Borkin, Robin Brooks, Fiona Lake and Michael Cahill
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唉。国家党太能折腾了。一个弹丸之地，又在天涯海角，要和中国挨着保准你新西兰富的流油，但。。太远喽。就离澳洲近，澳洲现在都自身难保了，你还想用房地产把新西兰经济折腾起来。步子大看你扯不扯到蛋。
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不要看新西兰当地什么报道,都是华人自己写的文章.
看看英文报道,Financial Times, Wall Street, Goldman Sachs Research, 这些才是最专业,最权威的人士分析的. 他们都是站在高度看全世界的一个客观分析, 新西兰当地人毕竟眼光狭窄,当地移民尤其华裔只觉得奥克兰怎么好,房子永远涨(因为买房的人都觉得自己房子会涨), 汇率永远不会贬.井底之蛙!
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2017 年。。。。。工党上去。。。。然后nzd大跌 看来最近的汇率比较稳定了。。。。。
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如果汇率跌倒对人民币4以下，那么房子价格肯定也会相应跌的 ，加上汇率的下跌，房价下跌的幅度可能会更大，不知道这样说，是否合理？
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合理
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对,到时候是双杀, 汇率房价齐跌, 到时新西兰受中国和澳洲经济影响,经济都不好了,还有什么移民有钱投资买房, 现在的新移民等到呆了2年后,新西兰都找不到工作,移民也会回去的.
澳洲财长已经承认澳洲房产bubble了,
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对,到时候是双杀, 汇率房价齐跌, 到时新西兰受中国和澳洲经济影响,经济都不好了,还有什么移民有钱投资买房, 现在的新移民等到呆了2年后,新西兰都找不到工作,移民也会回去的.
澳洲财长已经承认澳洲房产bubble了,
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呵呵， 高盛就这么灵光啊。 如果它这么厉害也就不会在2007-08年在证券及主要市场投资大幅亏损， 也不会有2012年它的资深执行董事格雷格.史密斯揭露高盛靠蒙骗客户赚钱。
雷曼兄弟在倒闭之前那也是华尔街叱咤风云的一员， 结果呢？
我无意争辩， 我们可以两年之内看看， 高盛的预言是否成真。
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强帖留名，两年后再看，求崩盘抄底Queen Street。
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原文链接？
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原文链接是一个在华尔街做投资的朋友发来的.
这些文章只有在内部公司系统才能看到包括financial times等, 只给公司顶级客户参考的.
只有进入专门大客户资料库的资格的才能看. 需要每年付费的
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想什么呢？
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回复9楼: 高盛是在2008年金融危机中损失最小的美国投行. 他在大部分人还未察觉之前已减少了相关头寸. 不得不赞这种先见之明的能力.
像高盛,大摩这些知名公司聚集了全世界最精英的投资分析银行家,至少知识和信息来源比在新西兰这个孤岛上的人要多, 做这一行的新西兰精英都跑到美国, 英国 ,香港工作了.
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why 不明白逻辑
汇率低，进口贵，有的进口部件成本上升
海外资金进来，抬高物价，包括房子
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貌似就是2017 美国要达到颠覆 新西兰如果没有强力制造业 全球农业国的大趋势 2017年经济开始下行 2017年低是个低谷
换句话说 在2017年前疯狂吧还有三年时间 你们在等什么 。。。
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3年够炒好多回了
大家快快冲进去炒吧
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留名看看，不论经济怎么样，相信有个自住房总比没有房子好
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想得简单了
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高盛,呵呵呵...
要不楼主找找以前高盛的各种预测看看.
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难道汇率和房价始终是同向波动的么，不懂啊，怎么个理论呢
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怎么把这个给透出来了，anyway，m明年年中有风险，当心吧，想风险小有三大要点：校区，校区和校区。
哈哈
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哎呀呀，摩拳擦掌等崩盘
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高盛玩儿的高级黑。
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没什么理论，50%靠手气 50%靠运气。
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自住房的投资价值中很大一部分就是抗通胀。
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完全没考虑中国因素啊，敢跌到4？买房的钱立刻把纽币淹没。。。。
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wait n see.
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房价汇率并没有想象的绝对相关性，但房价在涨的时候汇率降往往会继续推高房价，因为可以两头赚钱；相反的，房价快到头和或者已经在跌了，汇率也跌往往就会助推房价跌，因为不想两头受罪。所以关键还是房价自己到啥阶段了的问题，觉得高盛比羊们还是聪明点的。